mrt, Baudrillard, 9/27

     Honestly, I found Baudrillard's text about The Precession of Simulacra a little confusing, so I really appreciated his use of examples to contextualize his ideas. Namely on page 392 when he talks about the Lascaux caves, and the mummy of Ramses II. I think it is really interesting that he theorizes the creation of the replica of the cave rendered not only the recreation but the original cave artificial, that there is no longer any difference between the two. But, while I find this interesting, I think I'd have to disagree. Going back to Benjamin's ideas about technical reproduction, the reproduction of this cave puts the replica in situations that were not available to the original (in its intended purpose). When these cave paintings were created in the Paleolithic era, their intent was not to be seen or commodified by the masses-- their value lied in the cult. The shift towards exhibition value only took place when the caves were discovered and opened to the public. The replica, however, was built specifically to satisfy this exhibition value. I would argue the original cave could still be classified as authentic while the original could not (unless we take into account Benjamin's theories about the change in the meaning of authentic and original) so it is unfair to say there is no longer a difference between the two.

    On the other hand, I do agree with what Baudrillard says about the exhumation and conservation of Ramses II and think this also ties into Benjamin's ideas of cult v. exhibition value. On page 392, he claims that "Ramses does not signify anything for us, only the mummy is of an inestimable worth because it is what guarantees that accumulation has meaning" (Baudrillard, J., 1994). This is a great example of an object whose worth lies in its exhibition value. It's like the Mona Lisa, their worth lies in the financial value we place onto them for being visible connections to the past, their exhibition value heavily outweighs their cult value. Baudrillard also had some interesting ideas about these tangible connections to the past, stating "We require a visible past, a visible continuum, a visible myth of origin, which reassures us about our end. Because finally we have never believed in them" (1994, p. 392).